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FAILURE OF INDIA'S FINANCIAL STRATEGY FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE — EVIDENCE, CAUSES, AND POLICY CORRECTIONS

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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates India's financial strategy over the last decade and argues that macro-policy design and execution have underperformed relative to risks from external shocks, structural labour-market weaknesses, and trade imbalances. Using official macroeconomic and labour statistics (trade and balance-of-payments data, RBI/Economic Survey exchange-rate indicators, and PLFS employment indicators) the study documents (a) persistent trade imbalances with rising import bills, (b) a nominal/real exchange-rate trajectory that exposes vulnerabilities, (c) fiscal and public-debt pressures that limit fiscal space, and (d) ambiguous employment outcomes (debates exist between "jobless growth" narratives and official surveys showing rising LFPR). The paper diagnoses how partial policy responses (ad-hoc protection, targeted subsidies, emphasis on headline GDP growth without matching quality employment creation) contributed to systemic fragility. It concludes with actionable policy recommendations—trade rebalancing through higher-value manufacturing and services exports, fiscal consolidation targeted to capital expenditure, a credible exchange-rate & reserve buffer strategy, and labour-market reforms to raise formal employment—and a research agenda for future empirical testing.

Keywords: *India, financial strategy, trade balance, exchange rate, employment, jobless growth, fiscal policy, PLFS, RBI, external vulnerability*

1. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
India's economy has grown substantially since liberalisation, but recent years (2015–2025) have shown that headline GDP growth hides a complex set of vulnerabilities. These include persistent trade deficits, exchange-rate pressures, contested employment outcomes (is growth generating enough jobs?), and rising public debt that constrains countercyclical fiscal policy. Policymakers face the twin challenge of managing near-term shocks (commodity price swings, geopolitical trade frictions) while restructuring the economy for sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth. This paper evaluates whether India's financial strategy over the past decade has been fit for those challenges, and if not, why.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Historical Outline (2014–2025)
After the 2014–2015 policy push (Make in India, GST in 2017, large-scale digital & infrastructure programs), India pursued growth with selective reforms. Exports and services continued expanding, but import dependency on energy and key intermediates persisted. Fiscal deficits widened during the COVID shock and were narrowed only gradually. The exchange rate adjusted to external pressures, while labour-market outcomes remained contested: some surveys indicate rising employment, others point to weak employment elasticity of growth.

2.2 Conceptual Framework
The paper uses a vulnerability → transmission → outcome framework. Vulnerabilities: trade & current account structure, fiscal space, reserve buffer, labour market informality. Transmission channels: exchange-rate movements, capital flows, commodity shocks, and policy responses (tariffs, subsidies). Outcomes: growth volatility, unemployment/informal employment, external financing stress.

3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Data sources (primary)
- Trade and export–import time series and FY aggregates: Ministry of Commerce & Industry (Trade Stat, Press Information Bureau), World Bank trade indicators.
- Exchange-rate and effective exchange-rate series: Reserve Bank of India historical series and tables in the Economic Survey (NEER/REER).

- Employment, LFPR, WPR, unemployment: Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) annual reports and official press releases.
- Fiscal and public-debt indicators: Ministry of Finance (Economic Survey, Budget documents) and independent fiscal analysis (PRS/think-tanks).

Note: The five most load-bearing figures/statements in this paper are explicitly supported by the sources above; full references appear in the References section.

3.2 Analytical Methods

1. **Descriptive time-series analysis** (2015–2025 where available): trend decomposition of exports, imports, trade balance; nominal and real effective exchange-rate levels; fiscal deficit and public debt ratios; employment indicators (LFPR, WPR, UR).
2. **Comparative Snapshots**: FY comparisons (e.g., FY2015 vs FY2024/25).
3. **Diagnostic Causal Interpretation** (qualitative + suggestive quantitative tools): assess how policy choices (tariff adjustments, subsidy patterns, fiscal consolidation tactics) transmitted through exchange-rate and trade channels to the real economy and labour outcomes.
4. **Limitations:** The paper is largely descriptive and policy-diagnostic. Full causal identification would require firm-level microdata and formal econometric identification (IV / difference-in-differences), beyond scope here.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS — HEADLINE FACTS

4.1 Trade and Axternal Position (headline)

- **Total exports (merchandise + services)** for FY 2024–25 were estimated at **US$ 820.93 billion**, registering growth from FY2023–24. Merchandise exports for the same year were about **US$ 437.42 billion**, while merchandise imports were **US$ 720.24 billion**, implying a large gross merchandise trade deficit. These figures show a pattern of rapidly rising import bills driven by energy, electronics, and intermediate goods.

Interpretation: While exports rose, imports rose faster in key categories, widening trade pressures and increasing vulnerability to external shocks.

4.2 Exchange-rate and reserve context

- The nominal and real effective exchange-rate indices (NEER/REER) show episodes of depreciation followed by partial recovery, reflecting both global pressures and domestic inflation differentials. RBI and Economic Survey tabulations highlight fluctuations (with base 2015-16 = 100 for many indices). Reserve buffers were used strategically during shocks (COVID, commodity swings).

Interpretation: Currency flexibility has absorbed some shocks but has not eliminated external vulnerability because import dependence (especially on oil) makes the balance sensitive to crude price movements and global risk sentiment.

4.3 Employment & labour-market outcomes

- PLFS (July 2023–June 2024) reports **Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) at 60.1%** (usual status), Worker Population Ratio (WPR) at 58.2%, and **Unemployment Rate (UR) at 3.2%** for persons age 15+. These official series indicate rising LFPR and declining headline unemployment in recent PLFS releases.

Interpretation: Official labour surveys present an improving picture—but independent academic studies flag concerns about *job quality* (informal/self-employment vs formal salaried jobs) and employment elasticity (how many jobs are created per unit of GDP growth). There is active academic debate (some studies diagnose ‘jobless growth’; others argue employment rose strongly in recent years).

4.4 Fiscal posture and public debt

- The government targeted fiscal consolidation: fiscal deficit was projected to be reduced to ~**4.9% of GDP** for 2024–25 (budget documents and press briefings). Public debt metrics rose during the pandemic and remain a constraint on discretionary fiscal stimulus.

Interpretation: Reduced fiscal space limits India's ability to use counter-cyclical spending in case of large external shocks, and it forces a trade-off between revenue measures and capital expenditure.

5. DIAGNOSTICS — WHY THE STRATEGY FAILED (OR UNDERPERFORMED)

I summarise the main mechanisms by which financial strategy created or failed to mitigate vulnerabilities:

5.1 Structural import dependence & insufficient export complexity

Policy emphasis on export volume growth has not fully translated into higher share of high-value manufacturing exports. Large import dependence (energy, electronics intermediates) leaves the trade balance sensitive to global commodity prices, which fiscal/monetary policy alone cannot solve.

5.2 Exchange-rate management without matching structural adjustment

A partially flexible exchange-rate allowed adjustment, but without urgent structural reforms (supply chain deepening, local value addition), depreciation can feed inflation while failing to generate sufficient substitution away from imports.

5.3 Fiscal strategy trade-offs and limited countercyclical room

The post-pandemic focus on narrowing deficits and debt ratios was appropriate for long-run sustainability, but premature fiscal tightening during weak private demand episodes risks slowing investment and employment growth. Reliance on headline GDP recovery while deprioritising labour-intensive capital or MSME support limited job creation.

5.4 Labour-market mismatch and ambiguous metrics

Official labour surveys show improved LFPR/WPR, but they do not fully capture under-employment, low productivity self-employment, or informal jobs lacking social protection. Thus policy success on "employment" may be overstated without granular labour-market diagnostics.

5.5 Policy incoherence & ad-hoc protectionism

Frequent, sectoral ad-hoc tariffs and domestic content rules create unpredictability for global value chains. These measures can protect local firms short-term but deter long-term foreign direct investment in high-value manufacturing.

6. Policy recommendations for a resilient "New India"

I group recommendations into short-run stabilization and medium-term structural reforms.

6.1 Short-run stabilizers (1–2 years)

1. **Targeted import-substitution in intermediate goods:** Use time-limited, transparent incentives for domestic manufacture of critical intermediates (pharma inputs, electronics components) while keeping WTO and GVC commitments in view.
2. **Exchange-rate buffer strategy:** Maintain adequate FX reserves and a transparent FX-intervention rule to reduce disorderly volatility; use swaps/forward contracts to hedge strategic import bills (energy).
3. **Counter-cyclical capital expenditure:** Protect public capex (infrastructure, logistics) while sequencing fiscal consolidation to avoid choking demand prematurely. Use off-budget PPP structures with strict oversight.

6.2 Medium-run structural reforms (3–7 years)

1. **Manufacturing deepening & export complexity:** Industrial policy that links MSMEs into export value chains, invests in skill ecosystems near clusters, and accelerates green manufacturing (solar, batteries).

2. **Labour market reforms with social protection:** Simplify compliance for formal hiring, expand targeted wage subsidies for apprenticeships, and improve portability of benefits to make formal employment more attractive.
3. **Trade diplomacy for market access:** Diversify export markets and secure preferential access (trade agreements) for selected high-value sectors.
4. **Fiscal framework reorientation:** Move from blunt deficit targets to a debt-anchor strategy combined with transparent medium-term capital budgeting, protecting growth-enhancing capex.

6.3 Data & governance improvements

- Invest in higher-frequency firm-level and household labour surveys to measure employment quality and inform targeted policies.
- Improve transparency on sectoral support measures and enforce sunset clauses on protectionist interventions.

Table 1: Employment Indicators in India (Usual Status, Persons Age 15+)

Survey period	Labour-Force Participation Rate (LFPR) – Total (Rural+Urban)	Worker Population Ratio (WPR) – Total (Rural+Urban)	Unemployment Rate (UR) – Total (Rural+Urban)
2017-18	49.8 %	44.0% (≈) (Rural 48.1% + Urban ~43.9%)	5.3% (rural) / 7.7% (urban) approx
2022-23	56.7 % (rural) & 50.4 % (urban) → total ~54.6%	59.4% (rural) & 47.7% (urban) → total ~53.9%	UR rural 2.4% / urban 5.4%
2023-24	LFPR for female: 35.6%; male: 77.5%	WPR female: 40.3%; male: 76.3%	UR male: 3.2%; female: 3.2% (rural)

Analysis of Table 1:

- The LFPR (percentage of the population either working or actively seeking work) rose from ~50% in 2017-18 to ~54.6% in 2022-23, showing improved labour-market participation.
- The WPR (percentage employed) rose similarly in rural areas (from ~48% to ~59%) which is a strong improvement for rural employment.
- Unemployment rates show a marked drop, especially in rural areas (from ~5.3% in 2017-18 down to ~2.4% in 2022-23) which suggests that more people in the labour force are finding work.
- However: despite improved participation and employment, the quality of employment (formal vs informal, productivity) remains a question. The gender gaps remain large: female LFPR and WPR remain far below male levels (female WPR ~40.3% vs male ~76.3% in 2023-24) which highlights structural gender issues.
- The increase in LFPR/WPR may partly reflect necessity ("more people forced to seek work"), and the decline in UR may reflect absorption into low-productivity employment rather than high-quality jobs. This supports the narrative of "jobless growth" or "poor employment quality" which must be flagged in analysis.

Table 2: India's Merchandise + Services Exports (Selected Years)

Year	Exports of goods & services (US$ billions)
2020	~US$ 499.73 billion
2021	~US$ 677.77 billion
2022	~US$ 778.02 billion
2023	~US$ 779.45 billion

Analysis of Table 2:

- The jump from ~US$499.7 billion in 2020 to ~US$778 billion in 2022–23 is a large increase (~55% rise in two years) which reflects strong recovery after the pandemic shock.
- However, such growth in exports alone does not guarantee resilience: import bills, the trade balance, commodity-price swings and exchange-rate pressures also matter (these are **not** shown here).

- Moreover, the growth in export value may mask slower growth in *export complexity* or value-added (i.e., high-tech manufacturing vs low-value goods), an aspect relevant for assessing vulnerability.
- When paired with import data (not shown fully here), if imports grew faster or remained heavily dependent on critical inputs/energy, the net external vulnerability may increase.
- In terms of policy implications: the high nominal export figure is promising, but the strategy must focus on diversifying and deepening export structure, not just headline volumes.

Thought for 40s ›



Commentary & Implications for Your Research

- The employment indicators in Table 1 show improvement, which is positive—but they also highlight structural issues (gender gap, possible informality) which should be emphasised in your "failure of strategy" discussion.
- The export-data in Table 2 show recovery and growth, but you should combine this with import data (and trade balance data) to analyse net vulnerability: rising exports are good, but if imports (especially of energy, intermediates) rise faster, the external balance remains fragile.
- You should also compute indicators like **exports as % of GDP**, **imports as % of GDP**, **trade balance to GDP**, and track **exchange-rate movements** to capture vulnerability. For example, you can use the World Bank series: export of goods & services (% of GDP) for India. (World Bank Data)
- In your analysis section you should explain how improved participation/employment does *not* automatically mean good jobs or resilient employment – the strategy must shift from quantity to quality. Use the data to argue that while headline numbers improved, deeper structural vulnerabilities persist.

7. CONCLUSION

India's financial strategy over the past decade has delivered notable achievements—growth, rising exports, and stronger macro buffers—but it has underdelivered on resilience and inclusive job creation. The evidence points to rising trade import bills, exchange-rate sensitivity, constrained fiscal space, and ambiguous job quality outcomes. A reoriented strategy—one that prioritises export complexity, secures external buffers, protects growth-enhancing public investment, and reforms the labour market—can position India to manage uncertain futures. Empirical validation of specific recommendations requires more microdata and formal identification strategies; this paper provides the diagnosis and a policy blueprint.

9. REFERENCES (SELECTED & AUTHORITATIVE)

Key sources cited in the body (the five most load-bearing empirical citations):

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